The Blunders Of Quantitative Easing
A report from CNBC TV 18 in India. “Every second investment report on India sees housing as the most promising sector and yet we see defaults, slowdown in launches and declining sales dominating the industry. On the surface, the problem is, ‘Home prices are not affordable.’ But a more economically correct definition of the current situation would be : ‘At prices that buyers can afford homes, developers are unable to find land that can give developers economic return.’”
“To understand the root cause of a developer’s inability to find appropriate land parcels, one needs to go back to September 11, 2001. After the Twin Towers were felled, the US government feared that crashing consumer confidence could take the slowing economy into a recession. It therefore, adopted the easy money route. But even at low interest rates, there weren’t enough opportunities for investment.”
“Housing, as a result, became the darling of American financial markets. Homebuyers too were happy borrowing as low-interest rates meant buying was cheaper than renting. As soon as banks were able to find a wiling homebuyer, re-financing institutions were more than happy to refinance banks, creating an extremely efficient channel for the flow of newly printed dollars into US real estate.”
“With the US following easy money policy, few nations could follow a tight money policy. Money became easily available across the globe. The Indian government permitting foreign direct investment (FDI) in real estate in 2004, the excess global liquidity also found its way into India.”
“Indian real estate market took the prices of these marquee properties as benchmarks and real estate boom started spreading to smaller cities, towns and villages.”
“A crash in the housing market can cause a bigger emotional trauma than any stock market crash as most homebuyers are leveraged. So in 2008 when the housing market crashed in the US, its government was quick to realise the impending public distress. It pumped in money and saved the day.”
“The Indian market, however, had a different story. In 2008, responding to the US market, the Indian housing market dipped for a while mainly because of liquidity issues with some developers. But a large number of individual investors, who had missed the bus during 2004-08, were waiting to have a piece of estate. These were small investors but larger in numbers.”
“Banks and housing finance companies (HFCs) found them promising customers. So the real estate boom continued for another five years. But by 2013-14, developers had realised that the momentum had slowed. They were now looking at reducing their cost of land in new acquisitions. And this is where Indian land market exhibited its uniqueness. Market inefficiency in land markets came to the fore.”
“The land sale typically involves decision-making by multiple-owners (joint families, trusts, companies, societies, tenants etc.) and due to the psychological phenomenon called ‘Group Think’, rationality does not prevail in such decision-making and the group is unable to accept the market reality (slowdown in sales).”
“The land prices, therefore, do not come down. Moreover, in India, buying of land is seen as a sign of prosperity and selling land is associated with a stigma. Even in distress, few would consider selling land and among them, very few would agree to sell at less than the original purchase price. Thus, developers looking at buying land at discount to earlier prices are hardly able to any crack deal.”
“To make matters worse, during the past 8-10 years, state governments have started to look at housing as a key source of revenue. Circle rates were increased across the country. Service tax and now GST made a further dent into housing sales. Thus, the money left with developers for payment to landlord shrunk significantly. The offer from developers now appears to be a raw deal to landlords.”
“Circle rates and income tax laws further inhibit landlords from selling at lower prices. Market inefficiencies have thus created a big quagmire. Correcting market inefficiencies involve unpopular and difficult decisions; these are neither easy nor quick in a federal democracy like India.”
The Business Report on South Africa. “The average house price growth is likely to be slower than anticipated for this calendar year, with FNB forecasting another year of decline in house prices after taking in account the impact of inflation. John Loos, a household and property sector analyst at FNB, said the consistently negative real house price growth since early-2016 led FirstRand to believe that economic growth rates of 1 percent to 1.5 percent, along with little interest rate stimulus, were not be sufficient to create the level of housing demand that could mop up oversupplies, balance the market and lead to positive real house price growth.”
“Loos added that the longer-run performance of FNB’s repeat sales house price index in real terms was at relatively expensive levels and 91 percent higher than the January 2001 pre-boom index levels despite the significant cumulative ‘post bubble correction.’ The ‘bubble’ refers to the pre-2008 housing bubble. Loos said the ‘post bubble correction’ to date had come in two phases, with the first a sharp decline in real house prices of -21.2 percent from the all-time high in August 2007 to July 2009.”
“He said that there was a period of mild recovery between August 2009 and February 2015, with cumulative real house price growth of 4 percent, but that this mini recovery occurred on the back of massive monetary and fiscal stimulus packages, both globally and locally, that had been aimed at ending the 2008/09 recession and global financial crisis.”
“In South Africa, the Reserve Bank implemented major interest rate cuts at the time, with the prime rate dropping from 15.5 percent in late 2008 to 8.5 percent by mid-2012. Loos said that the global and local stimulus had helped the economy recover moderately and that the stimulus helped economic growth recover to 3.3 percent post the 2008 recession peak. Loos said the rental market was also mired in mediocrity in a weak economy, but there had been a -2 percent decline in FNB’s Price-Rent Ratio Index since the post recession high reached in May 2006, with the index 11.86 percent lower than in January 2008. ”
“However, Loos said the stimulus began to wear off from 2012 and economic growth began a broad stagnation and interest rates started to drop from early 2014 until early 2016. Loos said these events led to the start of the second phase of the post bubble correction, resulting in real house prices to date declining cumulatively by -2.5 percent since February 2015.”
From Ekathimerini on Greece. “We are at the 10th anniversary of the global financial crisis that laid ruin to the Greek economy. The overriding lesson of the global crisis is the persistently weak governance of the global financial system. I count six basic blunders that cost the world trillions of dollars in lost output and years of anguish. Unfortunately, among the worst blunders has been the handling of the Greek crisis, including the recent empty declarations that the crisis is over. If only life were as easy as the fantasies of the politicians and of European Union bureaucrats who routinely checked the boxes.”
“Blunder 1. Excessive liquidity and financial deregulation (pre-2008). At the core of the 2008 financial crisis was a major expansion of credit that greatly outpaced the real economy during the years 2001-2007. With Wall Street’s political power ascendant in the Clinton Administration during 1993-2000, the US government deregulated Wall Street in the late 1990s and the Federal Reserve pumped credits into the deregulated banking system in the early 2000s. The result was a housing bubble and leveraged balance sheets of America’s major financial companies (including commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance companies).”
“Blunder 6. Leaving future growth to quantitative easing rather than public investments. Both the US and Europe cry out for upgraded and updated infrastructure. Genoa’s recent bridge collapse is a tragic manifestation of infrastructure that is woefully inadequate for the 21st century, especially in the era of global warming, with the burdens of rising sea levels, more droughts, more floods and more intense storms. Yet both the US and the EU have continued to pump up the economy through easy credits, which are highly vulnerable to another boom-bust cycle, rather than through long-term infrastructure investments. (Easy credits were the right policy immediately after the Lehman failure, but the growth package should have shifted from easy credits to increased public investments later on.)”
“The macroeconomics profession has also failed. At an analytical level, the two competing schools of macroeconomics, the Keynesians and the neoliberals, both got it wrong. The Keynesians treated the 2008 financial crisis as a crisis of aggregate demand rather than as a financial and structural crisis. The neoliberals (like Weidmann) were far more damaging in their incorrect belief that market forces could quickly overcome the financial crisis and even resolve the overhang of debt.”
“Even worse, the macroeconomics profession generally stood on the sidelines as Greece suffered a persistent and catastrophic collapse of output deeper than the Great Depression. Until today, it has mostly nodded silently as Europe offered Greece one illusory ’solution’ after another.”